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Introduction
Picture the following situation: A police officer pulls you over, or shows up at your
house with an arrest warrant. You are placed in the back of a police car. During your ride to the
police station, or while seated in the back of the car, the police officer asks you questions about
the crime you’re accused of committing. Would you answer the questions? Would you feel free
to leave? Would you feel free to terminate your interactions with the police officer? Do you
consider yourself a reasonable person?
Miranda v. Arizona created an important standard in the law of criminal procedure in the
United States.1 It ensures that those subject to custodial interrogations will be informed of their
constitutional rights. These constitutional rights include the individual’s right to remain silent,
that anything they say can and will be used against them in a court of law, and that they have the
right to an attorney.2 Miranda warnings are not required in every police interaction.3 Rather,
the law requires that Miranda warnings be issued when two factors are present: that the
individual was in custody, and that the police interrogated them.4 The law since Miranda,
however, has struggled to define exactly what conditions and circumstances define a “custodial
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See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See Id. at 476.
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See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); R.I. v. Innis, 446 U.S.
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interrogation,” and thus require Miranda warnings.5 One factual circumstance that has resulted
in a federal circuit split is whether an individual placed in the back of a police car should be
considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda warnings.6
Currently, when the issue is the admissibility of a statement made without Miranda
warnings, courts use a reasonable person standard based on the totality of the circumstances to
establish whether the individual was in custody.7 Courts analyze whether the person felt free to
leave the situation, or whether their movement was restrained to the degree of a formal arrest.8
This comment proposes a restructuring of the totality of the circumstances analysis by placing a
stronger emphasis on the inherently coercive nature of the environment of a police car. I propose
creating a rebuttable presumption, which asserts that a person is seized when they are questioned
in the back of a police car, and thus should be considered “in custody.” The proposed
presumption is rebuttable by the prosecution asserting certain facts that include whether the
individual was told he was free to leave, was not handcuffed, or was not restrained in any
manner. Ultimately, because no reasonable person would feel free to get out of the back of a
police car and walk away once placed there by a police officer, this presumption renders the
coercive environment the most important factor in the custody determination analysis.
Part I of this comment will address the background of relevant constitutional law,
namely Miranda v. Arizona and the cases that followed it that defined custodial interrogations.
The background section will also address the current federal circuit split that exists on this issue.
Part II of this comment addresses the proposed presumption as well as the facts that can be
5
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asserted by the prosecution to successfully rebut the presumption of custody. It will also address
the purposes of the presumption as well as the possible benefits and negative consequences of
implementing this solution into criminal justice practice. Lastly, this comment will address any
remaining questions and legal issues left open by this proposal.

Part I: Background
To fully examine the legal concepts surrounding Miranda law, one must first identify the
relevant Constitutional law, the precedent established in Miranda v. Arizona, as well as the cases
that followed Miranda. Additionally, one must look to the current federal circuit split on the
issue of a custody determination in cases where the defendant is questioned in the back of a
police car and the factual circumstances of these cases.
A. Relevant Constitutional Law
The Constitutional law applicable to the Miranda custody analysis includes case law that
has served to ensure the constitutional guarantees of protection from unreasonable seizures, as
well as protection against self-incrimination.9 These constitutional rights are located in the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that, “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”10 The definition of seizure is important to this analysis because
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See U.S. CONST. am. IV and U.S. CONST. am. V.
U.S. CONST. am. IV.
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of its analytical similarities to the determination of custody.11 The purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is “not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but ‘to prevent
arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal
security of individuals.’”12 The Fourth Amendment seeks to provide a balance between personal
liberties, as well as the legitimate investigative needs of law enforcement.13 Therefore, the
determination of whether a person has been seized is important to determine whether the proper
protections were afforded to that individual, specifically by analyzing the reasonableness of that
seizure.14
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “No person … shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law…”15 The privilege of self-incrimination is important to this
analysis because the constitutional safeguards established in Miranda v. Arizona were decided in
order to protect this privilege.16 The Miranda warnings ensure when a detained individual is
questioned, he knows his rights against self-incrimination.17 Miranda also extended this Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination to pre-trial matters, finding that it is equally
important to ensure this right to individuals in police custody as it is to ensure the right to
individuals during criminal trials.18
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B. History of Miranda law
Miranda v. Arizona examined whether statements obtained from an individual who is
subjected to a custodial police interrogation are admissible in court.19 The case also examined
the police procedures necessary to constitutionally safeguard the individual’s privilege against
self-incrimination.20 The Court established that a defendant must be warned before questioning
that he had the right to remain silent and that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, and that he had the right to the presence of an attorney.21 The Court recognized that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was jeopardized where an individual is
taken into custody and subjected to questioning.22 After the Miranda warnings are read, the
defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the rights and agree to answer questions or give
a statement to the police.23 The Court mandated that an individual be informed of their rights
prior to questioning, due to the inherent coerciveness of a custodial interrogation.24
Following Miranda, cases sought to both expand and limit the legal principles
established. A bright line rule was established that if a person is arrested, he is in custody for the
purposes of Miranda warnings.25 The Supreme Court also held that a person who voluntarily
accompanied the police, was left unrestrained and was not formally under arrest, was not in
custody.26 In the same case, the Court also held that while “circumstances of each case would
certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ for purposes of receiving
Miranda protection” that ultimately, the inquiry is “simply whether there is ‘formal arrest or
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Id. at 439.
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Id. at 467-468.
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Id. at 467 (citing U.S. CONST. am. V).
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
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restraint on freedom of movement’ of degree associated with arrest.”27 The Court emphasized
that Miranda warnings are not required “simply because the questioning takes place in a station
house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.”28
Two years following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda, the Court further defined
“seizure” in Terry v. Ohio.29 Though the main focus of the Terry decision was to define the
police procedure of “stop and frisk,” the Court also further defined the circumstances
surrounding seizure of individuals.30 In Terry, it was determined that all seizures of individuals
do not occur in the traditional context of arrests, and yet such seizures are still governed by the
Fourth Amendment.31 The Court reasoned that, “[i]t must be recognized that whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that
person.”32 The police officer seizes an individual when they execute a “show of authority”
which occurs when an officer “by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen.”33 Terry expanded the context of a seizure, and underlined the
importance of constitutionally safeguarding a restraint on an individual’s liberty.34
As the Supreme Court began to further define seizure law, the development of an
objective test emerged.35 In United States v. Mendenhall, the Court stated that “as long as the
person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there
has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy.”36 Ultimately, the Court held that a
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Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125.
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person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in the view of all
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that she was
not free to leave.37 This standard to determine whether a seizure of an individual has occurred is
a merging of a totality of the circumstances, and reasonable person standard.38
Ultimately, both the analysis for seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the analysis
for a custody determination for Miranda rights look to the beliefs of a reasonable person, totality
of the circumstances and the belief of freedom of movement.
C. Definition of Custody
The cases described above are just a few of the many in which the courts have defined,
expanded or limited the definitions of seizure and custody.39 As it currently stands, the legal test
for determining a seizure and custody are almost identical. However, the concept of a seizure
refers to the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from unreasonable
searches and seizures by state actors.40 The concept of “custody” is important in determining if a
custodial interrogation exists, where the individual must be read their Miranda rights in order to
protect the privilege against self-incrimination.41 While different legal concepts, the test for
both, as established by the Supreme Court, is a totality of the circumstances analysis that seeks to
determine whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or terminate the police
interaction.42 Therefore, if a person has been found to be in police custody for purposes of
Miranda, it follows that a seizure of that person has also occurred. However, the courts are not
clear on whether a seizure of that individual would be the equivalent of that person also being
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Id. at 554.
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See supra notes 19-38.
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U.S. CONST. am. IV.
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See U.S. CONST. am. V.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
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considered in police custody. One reason for this inequality between a “custody” determination
and a “seizure” determination is because the legal test is a totality of the circumstances analysis,
which allows a court to consider certain factors more heavily than others, depending on the facts
of the case and that case’s potential outcome.43 However, while the factual analysis or outcomes
may be different between the two legal concepts, the legal test remains the same.44 Because of
the similarities of the two legal tests, this comment suggests that when a person is seized under
the 4th Amendment in the back of a police car, the Court should consider that person to be “in
custody” for purposes of the 5th Amendment.45
D. Federal Circuit Split
Currently, there is a federal circuit split on the issue of whether, when questioning an
individual in the back of a police car, the individual is considered to be “in custody” to require a
reading of Miranda rights.46 Circuit courts define this issue in different ways. Some circuits
focus on the definition of seizure under the Fourth Amendment, while others focus on the legal
concept of “in custody.” Either way, the circuits are split on whether, when in the back of a
police car, a reasonable person would feel they were free to leave the situation.
The Ninth Circuit is the most recent circuit to decide this issue.47 Burlew v. Hedgpeth
held that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made his incriminating statement.48 At
the time, Burlew was sitting in the back of the patrol car, but he was not handcuffed and was not
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See Id.
See Id.
45
See U.S. CONST. am. IV; U.S. CONST. AM V.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (Also note, that this logic
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analysis as to whether or not the seizure of that individual was unreasonable under the 4 th Amendment, though this
exceeds the scope of this comment.)
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See supra note 4.
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told he was under arrest.49 Based on these facts, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was
not in custody. In its decision, the Ninth Circuit recognized the circuit split that existed on this
issue. In a previous case, the Ninth Circuit held that an individual in the back of a police car was
in custody.50 In United States v. Henley, an FBI agent questioned the defendant while the
defendant was handcuffed in the back of the police car.51 However, the defendant was not
formally placed under arrest.52 The factual difference between the defendant in Burlew and the
defendant in Henley is that the defendant in Henley was handcuffed while seated in the car.53 In
Henley, the Ninth Circuit found the defendant was in custody. Thus, it is clear that the Ninth
Circuit placed a strong emphasis on the factor of whether the individual is handcuffed in making
custody determinations.54 Thus, whether or not a suspect has been handcuffed while sitting in
the back of a police car may be a factual circumstance of a case that serves to rebut the proposed
presumption of custody.55
The Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit both found that a defendant was “in custody” in
cases where incriminating statements were made in the back of a police car. In Figg v. Shroeder,
the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant was seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because it was an undisputed fact of that case that he was not allowed to leave,
despite not being formally arrested in the back of the car.56 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that in
the absence of a formal arrest, the trial court should look to whether a seizure occurred in order
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Id.
United States v. Henley, 984 F. 2d 1040 (9 th Cir. 1992).
51
Henley, 984 U.S. at 1042.
52
Henley, 984 U.S. at 1042.
53
Id.
54
Compare Burlew v. Hedgpeth, 443 Fed. Appx. 663, 664 (9th Cir. 2011) to United States v. Henley, 984 F. 2d
1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 1992).
55
See Part II: Analysis; Factors that Rebut the Presumption.
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Figg v. Shroeder, 321 F.3d 625 (4 th Cir. 2002).
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to determine if the individual was informally arrested.57 The court found it dispositive that the
individual would not have been allowed to leave the patrol car in which he was detained, thus he
was subjected to a Fourth Amendment seizure.58 The court did, however, ultimately conclude
that these seizures did not violate the Constitution.59
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Richardson, also found that the individual, while in
the back of the police car, had been seized under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.60 The
court enumerated factors that may lead a reasonable person to conclude they were not free to
leave.61 These factors included the threatening presence of several officers, physical touching of
the person of the citizen, an officer displaying a weapon, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer’s request is not optional.62 The court also cited Terry
v. Ohio, stating that a seizure of a person will occur when the officer “by means of physical force
or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”63 In this case, four
officers approached the defendant and informed him that he was a subject of a drug
investigation.64 When the officers asked for consent to search, the defendant refused.65 As a
result of his refusal to consent, he was placed in the back the police car.66 Similar to the facts of
Figg, the defendant here was also not formally arrested, but the court found it was reasonable for
him to believe he was not permitted to leave.67 The court reasoned that if, “after refusing to
consent to a search, a person was placed in the back of a police car by “agents” who had no

57

Id. at 636.
Id.
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60
United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991).
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Richardson, 949 F.2d at 856.
62
Id. quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
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Id. quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
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intention of allowing him to leave, that person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.”68 Thus, the Sixth Circuit found a seizure of the individual occurred.69
These cases uphold the Miranda law effectively and better protect the privilege against
self-incrimination established in the Fifth Amendment.70 However, other circuits have not been
as amenable to the protection against self incrimination, thus creating the federal circuit split at
issue.71
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits came to the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit in its
decision in Burlew, finding that the defendants were not in custody when they were questioned in
the back of a police car.72 The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Murray, held that evidence
seized from the lawful traffic stop of the defendant and his self incriminating statement about
possessing the gun found in the car, were properly admitted.73 The defendant was placed in the
squad car after the officers discovered crack cocaine in the car.74 Upon further search, the
officers also discovered a firearm.75 The officer opened the door of the squad car, and while
holding the gun, asked the defendant if he knew who owned it.76 The defendant stated that he
did not know who owned the gun, but that he did own the car.77 The court reasoned that the
defendant was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda warnings because there was no
evidence in the record to support that his freedom of movement was restrained.78 Other factors
the court considered was that only a brief period of time elapsed between the initial stop and the
68

Richardson, 949 F.2d at 855.
Id.
70
See United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Henley, 984 F. 2d 1040, 1042 (9 th
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time of the questioning, nor was there any evidence that the officers engaged in conduct that
overcame the will of the defendant.79 Despite the court deeming the most relevant inquiry to be
how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation, the court
held that the defendant was not in custody.80
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Boucher, found that a reasonable person in
Boucher’s position would not have considered the officer’s questions in the patrol car to be a
“custodial interrogation.”81 In Boucher, the defendant claimed that his statements were illegally
obtained because he was not given Miranda warnings and the items found in the subsequent
search were fruits of an unconstitutional custodial interrogation.82 The court did not agree with
the defendant’s position.83 Rather, the court found that the questioning of the defendant could
not be considered an interrogation because the defendant did not know that the officer had
spotted a gun lodged between his seat, thus the defendant was unaware that he could incriminate
himself.84 On the issue of custody, the court found that the defendant was not in custody simply
because the questioning is conducted in a certain place, like a police car.85 The court reasoned
that placing an emphasis on the location of the questioning was improper in making a custody
determination.86 The court held that a “reasonable person in Boucher’s position would not have
considered [the police officer’s] questions in the patrol car a custodial interrogation.87
The solution proposed in this comment, which would create a presumption of custody
when a defendant is questioned in the back of a police car, is contrary to the decisions of the
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Seventh and Eighth Circuits. The solution proposed here suggests that if this issue were to ever
reach the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court should consider the decisions of the
Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits as having decided these issues in accordance with the legal tests
already established by the Supreme Court in previous cases.
Part II: Analysis
A. Creation of Rebuttable Presumption
As previously stated, the laws surrounding seizure and custody determinations are
essentially analyzed under the same legal standard.88 Therefore, where a seizure occurs, the
courts should consider that individual to be “in custody.”89 Miranda rights were created in order
to guard against the inherently coercive environment of a custodial interrogation.90 This inherent
coercion was originally developed in the context of a police station questioning, however, now,
“custody” is no longer defined as the traditional concept of being arrested and or being held in
the police station.91 One of these contexts that should be considered inherently coercive is when
the defendant is seized in the back of a police car.
Currently, the standard that exists for a custody determination is a reasonable person
standard based on the totality of the circumstances that asks the question of whether that
reasonable person would feel free to leave or terminate the interaction with the police.92 This
standard should be altered to create a presumption that if the defendant is interrogated while in
the back of a police car, there has been a seizure of that person, and further that person was “in
custody.”93 Because of the inherent coercion that exists in that location, the court should assume

88

See supra notes 39-45.
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that the reasonable individual would not feel free to leave.94 As a result of this inherent coercion
and subsequent custody determination, the presumption would dictate that that individual must
be provided with Miranda warnings when interrogated in the back of a police car.95 The burden
would be on the prosecution to rebut this presumption. In order to rebut the presumption, the
prosecution must allege facts on the record that establish that the individual did have freedom of
movement, thus rendering the defendant not in custody, and Miranda warnings unnecessary.96
B. Purpose of the Presumption
Often cases with Miranda legal issues are in court because the defendant is asserting that
a statement he or she made should be inadmissible because the defendant was not aware of his or
her Miranda rights when he or she made the incriminating statement. On the other side, the
prosecution is asserting that the person was not in custody, and thus the police were not required
to read the defendant his or her Miranda rights. The legal standards exist for the purpose of
providing judges a way to answer this question. These standards are vital to the legal system,
and while they will always be imperfect and have weaknesses, it is important to try and account
for as many facts and circumstances as possible.
When determining legal tests in this area of the law, it is important for courts to balance
the need for effective law enforcement and the rights of American citizens.97 “The purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but to
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prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and
personal security of all individuals.”98
One underlying purpose of the Miranda law was to alert the public when their rights are
being violated or are in danger of being violated.99 The creation of this presumption will
preserve the Supreme Court’s underlying aim established in Miranda.100 It produces a workable
legal standard that will allow members of the public to know when they are actually in custody
and when they are free to exercise their right against self-incrimination.101 The current standard
of a totality of the circumstances analysis does not allow for this clarity. More importantly, the
proposed presumption will protect the individual even in the event that they are not made aware
of their rights.102
C. Inherently Coercive Environment Determination
The purpose of the Miranda law is to provide constitutional safeguards in inherently
coercive police dominated situations.103 In order for the privilege of self-incrimination to be
effective, it also has to apply before trial.104 Otherwise, the police could circumvent the privilege
it by interrogating as suspect beforehand, and then using that prior statement against the
individual at trial.105 Therefore, the Court determined that without procedural safeguards, police
interrogation is inherently coercive due to “inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not
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otherwise due so freely.”106 Therefore, the Court does not need to inquire into the facts of the
given case.107 Because custodial interrogations are considered inherently coercive, as long as the
individual was interrogated in custody, the Court will presume that statements made by the
individual were influenced by that coercion.108
Miranda also outlines the details of the coercive police tactics that led the Court to
determine the need for procedural safeguards.109 For example, the Court in Miranda recognized
that many police manuals detail methods for intimidating defendants into providing
incriminating information.110 For example, Miranda cites one police handbook that states,
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the
investigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The
subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In
his own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is
more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his
indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home.
Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their presence
lending moral support. In his own office, the investigator possesses
all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the
forces of the law.111
The Court found it was clear that the aim of these police tactics was to isolate the individual, thus
depriving him of “outside support.”112 The Court noted that, “when normal procedures fail to
produce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false
legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his
insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of
exercising his constitutional rights.”113 Thus, in Miranda the Court chose to concern itself with

106

Id.
Id. at 491.
108
Id.
109
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 (1966).
110
Id.
111
Id. (quoting O'Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation (1956) at 99).
112
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966).
113
Id. at 455.
107

16

the “evils” that police interrogation procedures could bring.114 The likelihood of coercion is the
policy reason for the creation of the procedural safeguards that are now referred to as an
individual’s “Miranda rights.”115 These constitutional rights include the right to remain silent,
that anything you say can be used against you in the court of law, the right to counsel and that if
one is unable to afford an attorney, that the court will appoint an attorney.116
Ultimately, in Miranda, by creating a presumption that being interrogated by the police in
custody is inherently coercive, the Court places the burden on the police to show that they made
the person aware of their rights.117 Without such a showing, it would be very difficult for the
police to use any subsequent statements at trial.118 These same factors of inherent coercion the
Miranda court found applied to police stations can also be applied to the environment of a police
car.
This solution does place emphasis on a factor that has previously not been considered
dispositive in the Miranda analysis.119 This solution will put the emphasis on the inherently
coercive nature of the environment of the back of the police car.120 Based on the established
legal test, the place where an interrogation occurs does not conclusively establish the presence or
absence of custody.121
Previous cases have held that a non-custodial situation does not become a custodial
interrogation because a court concludes that the questioning took place in a “coercive
environment” in the absence of a formal arrest or restraint on the freedom of movement.122 The
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Court has also determined that questioning that took place in a prison, without more factors of
coercion, was not enough to constitute custody under the meaning of Miranda.123 The Court has
never found that a coercive environment was dispositive to determine that the person was “in
custody” for the purposes of Miranda.124 This proposed solution alters these previous holdings
by asserting that some environments should be considered so coercive as to create a presumption
of custody.
Originally, the context of Miranda focused on interrogations that occurred in a police
station.125 This context must be expanded to adapt to the current problems facing law
enforcement and the citizenry’s knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of their constitutional rights.
Questionings that take place in the back of a police car can be compared to the traditional
scenario of a defendant being questioned in a police station.126 Both are police dominated
atmospheres that are associated with formal arrest.
Additionally, there are certain factors surrounding a questioning in a police car that also
contribute to the inherent coerciveness of the environment. A reasonable person may find that
questioning in the back of a police car even more inherently coercive than the environment of a
police station.127 For example, an individual would have less freedom of movement in the back
of a car than in a holding room at a police station, especially if the police car is moving and
transporting them to a destination.128 The fact that the car is capable of movement contributes
strongly to a reasonable person’s opinion that they would not be free to leave.
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Secondly, most police cars lack handles or any way in which an individual would be able
to physically exit the vehicle once the door was shut. This factor, or even an individual’s
knowledge of that fact, renders a police car a more intimidating environment for interrogation.
There is also a power dynamic associated with the front seat and the back seat of
vehicles. Those in the front seat, or the driver’s seat, are in control of the vehicle. Those who
are seated in the backseat are subordinate to that driver and their control of that vehicle. This
power dynamic exists outside of the presence of a police officer, and enhances the perceived
power of the vehicle’s driver. Add a police presence to this scenario, and that power dynamic
becomes even more extreme.
Additionally, general public knowledge associates being placed into the back of a police
car with being under arrest. The media and other news outlets, as well as mainstream television
and movies, often depict individuals under arrest being placed into the back of police cars. Often
in such scenes, the individual being placed in the back of the police car is read his Miranda
rights simultaneously. Depictions of crime and arrests on television and in the movies contribute
to a reasonable person’s expectations of “arrest” and the legal concept of when one is considered
“in custody.” There is also a strong public stigma against people who are arrests and those who
are in custody.129 Often those who are in custody can experience isolation, loss of jobs,
dislocation, family distress and loss of self-respect.130 And when the legal test for a custody
determination is whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave, these outside factors
toward arrests that contribute to how a reasonable person perceives a situation are relevant to that
determination.
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The Supreme Court has also engaged in discussions about the inherently fearful nature of
police presence, even to an innocent individual.131 In his dissent in Illinois v. Wardlow, Justice
Stevens posits that flight to escape police detection may have “entirely innocent motivation.”132
Justice Stevens disagrees with the majority that concluded that when the individual in question
fled from the police officer, it provided the officer with reasonable suspicion that allowed the
police officer to legally seize the individual.133 A “reasonable person” may conclude that an
officer’s presence indicates that there is criminal activity in the vicinity nearby, and that there is
a substantial element of danger associated with that criminal activity.134 Stevens concludes that
“[t]hese considerations can lead to an innocent and undesirable desire to quit the vicinity with all
speed.”135 Additionally, an entirely innocent individual may seek to leave the scene in fear of
being apprehended as a guilty party, or from an unwillingness to appear in court as a witness to a
crime.136 Justice Steven’s dicta in Wardlow provides context for an important aspect of this
presumption. A police presence can be fearful for individuals, whether they are innocent or
guilty.137 This presence becomes more intimidating when the police begin to question an
individual.138 Thus, police presence combined with interrogation results in a situation that is
often coercive in nature.139 This coercion is particularly present when there is a show of
authority involved, such as when the individual is placed into that officer’s official police
vehicle. 140
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As criminal law develops, it is clear that Miranda warnings should not solely be required
in the context of a police station interrogation. The courts should progress and recognize that
inherently coercive situations exist outside that traditional context. This presumption allows for
recognition of how a reasonable person perceives a situation when they are placed in the back of
a police car by establishing a presumption of custody in such situations.
E. Rebutting the Presumption
Additional factors of the detention, or the lack of the existence of certain factors, may
serve to assist the prosecution in rebutting the established presumption of custody. These
factors, examined by other courts in making custodial determinations, are very important to the
analysis. The “totality of the circumstances” test is based solely on the facts present on the
record.141 In light of the created presumption of custody here, the facts that form the totality of
the circumstances will now assist the prosecution in rebutting the presumption.142
The Supreme Court has identified some factors that would contribute to a reasonable
person not feeling free to leave a situation or terminate a police interaction.143 Those factors
include the threatening presence of several officers, physical touching of the person of the
citizen, an officer displaying a weapon, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer’s request is not optional.144 These factors, under the new
presumption of custody, are factors that would result in the court upholding the determination of
custody.145 Additionally, contrary factors or the lack of these factors could be used to assist the
prosecution in rebutting the presumption.146 For example, if the officer did not display a
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weapon, did not touch the individual, or if there was only one officer on the scene, under the
precedent of Mendenhall, the prosecution could argue the individual was not “in custody” for
purposes of Miranda rights.147
Another relevant factual consideration is whether the defendant was handcuffed. If the
defendant was not handcuffed, that factor would support the prosecution’s assertion that the
individual had freedom of movement and was not seized during the police interaction.148 In
some cases where the defendant was handcuffed, the Court found that the individual was in
custody.149 For example, in Henley, one factor that led the court to determine that the individual
was in custody was the fact that he was handcuffed while seated in the police car.150 Similarly,
in Burlew, when the defendant was not handcuffed, the Court rejected the argument that the
defendant was in custody.151 In some cases where there are other demonstrations of authority
present, the use of handcuffs may not be a dispositive factor.152 For example:
Under the totality of the circumstances approach now used by
courts, it is very likely that the court would find that when a person
is involuntarily removed from his home, especially in the middle
of the night, and taken in the police car down to the station, that he
was definitely in custody for Miranda purposes.’ This would hold
true even where the police don’t handcuff the suspect. Police
officers who wish to question ‘the usual suspects’ should make it
very clear to them if they are not under arrest that they do not have
to accompany the police and are free to leave the station at any
time.153
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The second factor is whether or not the defendant was formally arrested.154 If the
defendant had not been formally arrested, it would help the prosecution in rebutting the
presumption of custody.155 In Figg, the defendant was not formally arrested when he was placed
in the car, but he was still considered seized within the definition of the Fourth Amendment.156
In Richardson, the defendant was not formally arrested, but was seized because it was made
clear to him that he was not free to leave.157 Ultimately, if an individual has been informed that
he is officially under arrest, this should support a finding of custody based on the purposes and
principles underlying Miranda.158 Being officially under arrest would rise to the level of custody
described in Beheler, where the Court found that an individual is “in custody” when the police
encounter rises to the degree associated with a formal arrest.159
A third factor that the court may consider in the prosecution’s attempts to rebut the
presumption, is whether the defendant was directly told that he could not move.160 If the
defendant is never told that he or she could not move, it may help to rebut the presumption.161
On the contrary, if they are specifically told they cannot move during the course of the police
interaction, then clearly at this point their movement is restricted and they should be considered
seized.162 Thus, the presumption would stand if a person were told they were not free to leave
the police encounter.163
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Some state cases have also focused on a defendant’s proximity to a police car, even when
the individual was not physically detained inside the police car.164 For example, in People v.
Kennedy, the defendant was asked to step to the rear of a patrol car and was patted down.165 The
court determined that the officers had demonstrated sufficient control of the defendant’s physical
movement to warrant a reasonable belief on his part that he was not free to leave.166 Similarly,
where a defendant was drifting in and out of consciousness, was removed from his home and
propped up against the police car, the court held that the questioning throughout the interaction
constituted a custodial interrogation.167 The South Carolina Court of Appeals reasoned that
where the individual was physically removed from his home and carried to the police car and
handcuffed, it was clear that the police had taken that person into custody.168 Other courts
however, have taken a more strict approach.169 An Ohio District Court found that the suspect
was not in custody even when he was spread-eagled against a police car and patted down during
an investigatory stop.170 The court reasoned that requiring the suspect to place his hands on the
patrol car was reasonable given the officer’s belief that the individual was armed, and reasonable
force would not constitute the police officer’s actions rising the level of a custodial
interrogation.171
Some courts have also differentiated between placing the defendant in the front of the
police vehicle, versus in the back seat of the police vehicle.172 This raises the question of
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whether the prosecution would be able to argue that the front seat of a police vehicle is a less
coercive environment than the back seat of a police vehicle, which symbolizes a much more
traditional aspect of arrest.
Ultimately, these factual considerations are just some examples of the types of facts a
case may present that can assist a prosecutor in attempting to rebut the proposed presumption.
F. Interrogation Analysis
The proposed solution here focuses on the Fifth Amendment analysis in order to
determine whether a person should have been read their Miranda rights. In such an analysis,
first the court must determine if the person was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, then the
court must determine if the police engaged in an “interrogation” of the suspect.173 The
presumption proposed here focuses less on whether the police are “interrogating” the suspect,
and more on whether that person has been seized to the point of being considered “in custody.”
However, whether the officer was intending to get an incriminating response is a factor that goes
to the “interrogation” aspect of the custody determination.174
The Supreme Court in R.I. v. Innis stated, “that is to say, the term ‘interrogation’ under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”175 This definition
focuses on what is perceived by the suspect, not what the police intend in their questioning.176
The interrogation analysis is relevant to the proposed solution because some courts have
failed to find that a defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation in or around a police car
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not because the environment did not render the individual seized, but rather because the
questions asked by the police officers did not amount to the level of an “interrogation.”177 For
example, in People v. Fulcher, the court found that the officer did not question the subject in an
effort to illicit an incriminating response, even though the defendant was temporarily detained
outside the police vehicle.178 Ultimately, even if the court determines that the individual was in
custody due to the presumption suggested here or otherwise, the second prong of the Miranda
legal standard must be met.179 The defense must also show that an interrogation occurred,
because the custody determination will not require a reading of Miranda rights.180

G. Applicable Miranda Exceptions
It should be noted that the Supreme Court found that Terry stops did not require Miranda
warnings and did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation.181 As a result, many courts
have determined that Terry detainees are not in Miranda custody.182 Factors relevant to this
decision include the brief period of time an individual is usually detained during a Terry stop, as
well as a typically less intimidating police presence.183 In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court held
that a traditional Terry stop of a vehicle did not render the person “in custody.”184 The Court
concluded the individual was not in custody because “the respondent…failed to demonstrate
that, at any time between the initial stop and arrest, he was subjected to restraints comparable to
those associated with formal arrest.” 185 The Court considered the fact that the interaction
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occurred over a short period of time, and that the individual was not told at any time that the
detention would not be temporary.186 There was one police officer asking a few questions and he
only requested that the respondent perform a balancing test.187 The Court held that, “treatment
of this sort cannot fairly be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest.” 188
Therefore in the event that a motor vehicle or a Terry stop involve the placing of an individual in
the back of the police car, it is possible the Court would extend the Berkemer holding to that
case, thus serving to rebut the presumption that the individual was placed in custody.
However, the Terry stop exclusion to Miranda created in Berkemer does not eliminate the
presumption proposed in this comment.189 The analysis should occur in all circumstances where
a person is asked questions while sitting in the back of the police car.190 Even Berkemer states
that once formally arrested, the individual must be read Miranda rights.191 Therefore, if the court
finds that the individual, when detained in the car, was subjected to the same restraint of
movement as a formal arrest, and the prosecution is unable to rebut the presumption than the
presumption of custody will stand.192 However, if the questioning occurs in the context of a
Terry stop, the court may consider this as a factor in the prosecution rebutting the presumption,
though it should not be dispositive.193
It should also be noted that already established exceptions to the Miranda rule will also
serve as exceptions to this presumption of custody. For example, the public safety exception
created in New York v. Quarles, will limit the presumption.194 In Quarles, the police frisked a
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subject inside a grocery store after a woman reported that he had raped her. When the police
realized he had an empty shoulder harness, they asked him where he hid the gun prior to reading
him Miranda warnings.195 The defendant was also handcuffed at the time of the questioning.196
However, the Supreme Court held that his statements were admissible despite the lack of
Miranda warnings by establishing a public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona.197 The Court
held that, if it would be reasonable for the police officer to be concerned about public safety, the
police can questions without first giving Miranda warnings.198 Additionally, the answers to
those questions can be admitted into evidence.199
Additionally, providing Miranda rights will likely not remedy the Fourth Amendment
violation of an illegal detention.200 In Dunaway v. New York, the police questioned the informant
and read him his Miranda rights at the police station, but did not have enough information to get
a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.201 The Court held that while proper Miranda warnings were
given and the petitioner’s statements were “voluntary,” they were inadmissible because the
petitioner’s confession occurred during his illegal detention.202 “Detention for custodial
interrogation, regardless of its label, intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment as necessary to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.”203
Additionally, “Miranda warnings and the exclusion of a confession made without them, do not
alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation.”204 Therefore, even with the proposed
presumption in effect, if the police presence is illegal or the undermining stop or arrest is invalid
195
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under the Fourth Amendment, then the presumption would likely not be rebuttable by the
prosecution in light of defense facts asserting the illegal detention.
H. Ramifications and Limitations to the Presumption
The proposed solution of creating the rebuttable presumption has potential benefits as
well as possible detriments to the mission of law enforcement. The solution is likely to be
characterized as serving or protecting the rights of defendants, as it serves to counter balance the
inherently coercive nature of detention in the back of a police car.205 However, it could also be
considered pro-prosecution because it will ensure that any statements made by the defendant will
be admissible in court, or in the very least, ensure that the defendant’s statements are not
excluded because he was not read Miranda warnings prior to the statement being made.206 It is
also possible that establishing this presumption will result in a more efficient motion practice
system, and decrease the amount of motions to suppress statements on the grounds that the
defendant was not read his Miranda rights.207
On the contrary however, if this presumption were to become law, police officers may
hesitate to place defendants in the back of police cars simply to control them, or the situation.208
Another possible consequence is that the police may err on the side of caution and handcuff the
defendants less frequently, especially if handcuffing a defendant is a factor that the court finds
rebuts the presumption.209 If handcuffing the defendant or placing them in the back of the police
car means that they must read the individual their Miranda rights, they may hesitate to detain
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that person in that manner.210 These effects could lead to endangering the police officers or even
the general public in the surrounding area.211
The goal of the presumption is to promote the reading of Miranda rights to individuals
who are being detained in coercive environments.212 The presumption aims to accomplish this
goal by placing the finder of fact in the defendant’s shoes prior to assessing the reasonableness of
police actions. However, there are concerns associated with changing the current objective
standard to one with more subjectivity. Such concerns include whether the defendant would be
required to testify as to what he or she actually felt during the time of the interrogation.
Currently, the objective nature of the standard allows a court to make that determination much
more efficiently and without such testimony. This shift in the standard may impact judicial
efficiency.
I. Public Opinion
In furtherance of the concepts explained throughout this comment, a survey was
conducted of average Americans on their views of policing and the concepts of arrest and
Miranda rights.213 The survey was responded to by seventy five individuals, 51% of whom had a
legal education background214, and 12% of whom had been arrested. Of the respondents, 77% of
them were between the ages of twenty three and twenty nine. The largest group of respondents
that responded were age twenty four, with twenty respondents and age twenty five, with fifteen
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respondents. 12% of respondents were between the ages of thirty and forty nine, and 11% were
age fifty and over.
The survey asked the respondents three questions on their feelings about terminating a
police encounters. When asked, “If you were stopped by a police officer and questioned about
your name and whereabouts, would you feel free to walk away from them without answering
their questions?” 88% of the respondents answered that no, they would not feel free to walk
away without speaking the officer. Similarly, 78% of the respondents said they would not feel
free to terminate a police encounter if the officer asked them to sit in the back of their squad car,
even if they were not handcuffed. If they were handcuffed, however, 87% of the respondents
would assume they were under arrest, even if they were not told they were formally under arrest.
Of the 75 respondents, the vast majority (81%)215 wrote that an individual should be read their
Miranda rights when they are arrested. This would mean that the overlapping group would
assume that Miranda rights should be read upon being handcuffed by the police, since the
majority of the respondents associated that action with formal arrest.
The survey also inquired about coercive environments. When asked, “Where would you
feel more intimidated if you were being questioned by the police in one of the following
locations?” The options were police station, police car, your home and roadside. 64% of the
respondents answered that the police station was the most intimidating environment for
questioning, while 26% responded that a police car was the most intimidating place. One
respondent who answered police car stated, “It’s probably a bad situation to be in a police car. At
least in a police station it’s a larger building and there is a possibility of being free to walk
around so long as you’re not restrained. It’s a much tighter situation in a police car and for some
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reason seems more intimidating.”216 Other respondents who chose the same answer, referencing
the limited space of a police car, the fact that the doors can not be opened from the inside, and
the lack of other people present. Another respondent stated that there is likely to be more
supervision of the officers and cameras protecting their civil liberties at a police station than in a
squad car.217 “If I were placed in a squad car it would signal to me that I am in an intimidating
situation” was the response of another survey taker.218
These concerns associated with the police car environment, as well as the perceived
inability to terminate police encounters when the law states that an individual is hypothetically
legally allowed to do so, show the public confusion over the standards that surround Fourth
Amendment rights and police activity. By creating a presumption that an individual is in custody
during an intimidating encounter with the police in a squad car, the court’s established standard
would become more synonymous with the expectations of the general public.
J. Social Science Concerns
Many issues that remain unanswered in regards to the topic of Miranda rights, arrests and
custodial interrogations are concerns of social science. The entire premise of this presumption
asks what is reasonable in policing and the enforcement of Fourth Amendment principles. What
is considered reasonable may vary depending on the community and it’s level of crime, the
norms followed by police officers and courts, and the viewpoints of community members.
Social scientists have begun to examine these issues in the context of stop and frisk, community
policing and judgments about detaining individuals.219
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For example, some social scientists posit that “individuals have implicit (nonconscious)
biases that can perniciously affect the perceptions, judgments and behaviors that are integral to
core Fourth Amendment principles.”220 In her scholarly articles, L. Song Richardson also
astutely notes that Fourth Amendment Scholars are particularly absent from the discussion of
behavioral science as it relates to Fourth Amendment and policing concerns.221 How individuals
react to police activity, and how the police view the individual’s behavior toward them, is
extremely relevant to the perceived “reasonableness” of one’s detention or seizure in a police
dominated atmosphere.222 These social science principles are particularly relevant to the creation
of this presumption, as it assumes an inherently coercive environment for the purposes of a new
legal standard.
In her articles, L. Song Richardson also discusses implicit biases in behavior in regards to
police activity, particularly how that science of implicit social cognition can contribute to the
understanding of police activities, especially as it relates to the treatment of nonwhites.223
Ultimately, “Negative stereotypes and unfavorable attitudes toward blacks can cause individuals
to treat them differently than non-stereotyped group members.”224 This concept is particularly
relevant in certain communities with a high minority population. In such communities, the
concept of what is “reasonable” for an individual to believe in the presence of police activity
could vary from what is considered reasonable in communities that are comprised of mostly
white individuals. Yet, our current legal jurisprudence does not in any way account for the make
up of individual communities as it relates to police presence and action.
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Ultimately, legal scholars should work to closely consider the social behavioral aspects of
Fourth Amendment enforcement and how that affects the legal standard and subsequent
outcomes for individuals, specifically in minority communities. Currently, however, a
reasonable person legal standard fails to consider these concerns, thus further supporting a
restructuring of the Miranda reasonable person analysis, as proposed in this comment.
Conclusion
The solution proposed in this comment, a rebuttable presumption of custody when a
suspect is interrogated in the back of a police car, seeks to counterbalance the inherently coercive
nature of a police encounter that occurs in a police car. While location has not been a previous
dispositive factor for a custody determination, the courts must recognize the inherently coercive
nature of such a location by moving away from the traditional context of custodial interrogations
in police stations. The creation of this presumption grants defendants the benefit of knowing
their rights during an inherently coercive situation, a right that Miranda v. Arizona sought to
afford all defendants that found themselves in a custodial interrogation. The totality of the
circumstances analysis that the courts previously applied to the custody determination will now
apply to the prosecution’s ability to rebut the presumption. The elimination of the totality of the
circumstances analysis, and its replacement with a pro-defendant’s rights presumption allows a
clear line to be drawn for police and law enforcement. The presumption is also supported by the
goal of ensuring that defendants know their rights, and the expectations of the general public.
The presumption will also serve to foster an environment where it is commonplace for a
defendant to be informed of his rights. The principles that underlined the Supreme Court’s
historically significant decision in Miranda v. Arizona must be upheld and protected in order to
preserve the Constitutional rights afforded to individuals in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
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Protection of those rights and of the integrity of the Constitution of the United States in criminal
proceedings must be of the utmost importance in our criminal justice system. This presumption
allows for the protection of those rights, while still maintaining the ability of law enforcement to
effectively perform their duties and protect societies.
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